Agony of the Republic

1

The Republic is mortally wounded. Neither politics nor arms are enough to defend it. Strategic retreat is useless. Dissension among leaders nullifies the resistance. Each considers their own position the primary asset to be defended. José Félix Ribas proclaims himself chief of the West, a precarious region he does not actually control. Simón Bolívar and Santiago Mariño disembark after forcing the privateer Bianchi to return two-thirds of the treasure he has stolen from the Republic. Ribas sends a squadron of riflemen to arrest them. On September 7, 1814, the Liberator writes: “It is not just to destroy men who do not want to be free, nor is freedom truly enjoyed under the rule of arms against the opinion of fanatical beings whose depravity of spirit makes them love chains as social bonds.” The officers in charge of guarding them release them. Accompanied by forty loyal officers, they set sail for Cartagena on the schooners “Arrogante Maturinés” and “La Culebra.”

2

Cartagena is a port city with nearly impregnable fortresses that control access from the Caribbean and the entrance to New Granada via the Magdalena River. From there, Bolívar arrives in Mompox on October 13, where Mayor Pantaleón Germán Ribón supports him with funds and troops. He immediately marches to Cúcuta to join the contingent of a thousand fighters that Urdaneta has managed to save. “Liberators or dead!” is the slogan with which he greets them. In Pamplona, ​​the fighters acclaim him, carrying him on their shoulders; he thanks them in a proclamation of continental scope: “For us, the homeland is America; our enemies, the Spanish; our banner, independence and liberty!”

3

In Tunja, he justified his actions before Congress. The President responded: “General: Your homeland has not died as long as your sword exists; with it you will again rescue it from the dominion of its oppressors. The Congress of Granada will give you its protection because it is satisfied with your conduct. You have been an unfortunate soldier, but you are a great man.” The authorities appointed him commander-in-chief and entrusted him with reintegrating Cundinamarca and Bogotá into the liberated New Granada.

4

For this task, the Liberator had insufficient resources. In a proclamation of December 17th to the citizens of Cundinamarca, he stated: “The needs of the army are evident: it is destitute and has not received pay for nearly a year. In the urgent need to continue its marches against our common enemy, its shortages expose it to the risk of perishing from exposure and hunger; I have appointed a commission of 12 respectable citizens to collect your donations; other, more reliable means elsewhere are unworthy of a free and generous people…” The liberation campaigns were always victorious despite being outgunned by the Empire.

5

Despite these shortcomings, on December 11, 1814, Bolívar liberated Bogotá and triumphantly established himself there. Following the victory, the government of the United Provinces of New Granada appointed the Liberator Captain General of the Armies of the Republic, and his colleague Rafael Urdaneta, Division General. Nevertheless, the Liberator's enemies subjected him to a military trial, in which he was acquitted. On January 13, 1815, the Federal Congress of New Granada arrived from Tunja and convened in the liberated Bogotá.

6

Bolívar had led two lightning offensives that shattered imperial power: the Admirable Campaign of 1813 and the one that liberated Santa Fe de Bogotá in 1814. He was already planning a third, which would occupy him for a decade. The hero was absolutely clear. On December 24, 1814, he wrote to Custodio García Rovira, president of the Union: “Believe me, my friend, if I wish to be granted broad authorization regarding the war, it is because I am determined to take Santa Marta, Maracaibo, Coro, and return via Cúcuta, to liberate the South as far as Lima, if possible (…)”. For Bolívar, the homeland was always America.

7

As happened in Venezuela during the First Republic, New Granada is mired in complex conflicts. It is not simply a matter of enmity between royalists and patriots. The latter, in turn, are divided into federalists, proponents of extreme and unsustainable provincial autonomy, and centralists, advocates of unified command.

8

On January 24, 1815, Bolívar departed Bogotá to liberate Santa Marta, with a thousand Venezuelans brought by Urdaneta and another thousand from New Granada. Logistics and supplies were even scarcer than during the liberation of Bogotá. They had fewer than a thousand rifles. The collaboration of Cartagena was essential to capturing the royalist province of Santa Marta. This key fortified port, as we have seen, controlled maritime access to New Granada and defended entry via the Magdalena River. In 1741, the naval commander Blas de Lezo, under the command of Viceroy Sebastián de Eslava, defeated an invading English fleet of 130 warships, 2.000 cannons, and 23.000 infantrymen under the command of Lord Edward Vernon. Lezo blocked the maritime approaches by sinking some of his own ships, dug trenches to hinder the infantry, and withstood the siege until disease and hunger precipitated the invaders' retreat, with losses of 4.500 men, 6 ships sunk, and 17 severely damaged.

9

The Republican authority in Cartagena at the time, Brigadier Castillo, considered his stronghold an autonomous enclave rather than part of the United Provinces of New Granada and reacted with hostility and jealousy to Bolívar's attempts to extend the liberation to Santa Marta. Castillo refused to recognize Bolívar's leadership and demanded that the regional authorities disobey his orders.

In an inconceivable paradox, the obstacle that paralyzes the resistance against the Empire is the Republic's own armed forces.